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Jacobsen: Insurance

INSURANCE
I.

SUBROGATION

n Murphy v. Murphy' the beneficiary of a life insurance
policy that had been assigned as additional collateral for a debt
secured by a mortgage brought an action against the insured's
heirs at law. The beneficiary alleged that she was entitled to be
subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee because the indebtedness had been satisfied from the insurance proceeds. Pursuant to
the mortgage agreement, the mortgagor was required to assign
the policy in question to the mortgagee but was not required to
name him as beneficiary. This assignment gave the mortgagee
the right to hold the policy "as collateral security for any and all
liabilities." 2 The right to designate the beneficiary, however, was
reserved to the mortgagor.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, in reviewing the lower
court's holding for the beneficiary, determined that subrogation
has been allowed in cases where the parties intended real estate
to be the primary security, but has been denied where insurance
served as the primary security. 3 Following that practice, the court
examined the mortgage agreement and found that it recited only
that the mortgagee "may" require the mortgagor to carry life
insurance. The court considered such elective language a clear
indication that the real estate and not the insurance was the
primary security. The court reasoned that had the parties intended otherwise, they could have easily so specified in the contract. In the absence of a mandatory provision, however, the beneficiary was entitled to subrogation rights.4
II.

FRAUD

The insured in Hutto v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co. 5 brought an action for fraud and deceit in the inception
of her contract with Southern Farm and received a jury verdict
of $2,500.00. Southern Farm appealed, contending that the trial
court had erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict. It
1. 259 S.C. 147, 190 S.E.2d 735 (1972).
2. Id. at 151, 190 S.E.2d at 736.
3. See Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 496, 504 (1963); Ex parte Boddie, 200 S.C. 379, 21 S.E.2d
4 (1942).
4. 259 S.C. at 153, 190 S.E.2d at 737.
5. 259 S.C. 170, 191 S.E.2d 7 (1972).
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maintained that the only reasonable inference from the evidence
was that the plaintiff had failed to establish justifiable reliance
upon the oral statements made by the defendant's agent. Southern Farm also argued that the plaintiff's failure to read the policy,
which had been in her possession for eight months, constituted
gross negligence barring any reliance upon the alleged misrepresentation as a matter of law.'
The supreme court found that, during the four month delay
between the date the plaintiff paid her first premium and the
date the policy was delivered to her, the cause of action in fraud
had arisen and substantial damages had occurred. Therefore, the
court decided that damages accruing prior to the date of delivery
were not precluded by the plaintiff's negligence because during
7
that period she had not had an opportunity to read the policy.
III.

MULTIPLE POLICIES

In Emmanuel Baptist Church v. Southern Mutual Church
Insurance Co.,8 the plaintiff had constructed an addition to its
building. Because its insurer, Southern Mutual, refused to increase coverage, the church obtained additional coverage from
another company. The new insurance was secured only by an oral
binder when the church burned down, and the plaintiff sought
recovery under its Southern Mutual policy. Southern Mutual
contended that purchasing new insurance before the expiration of
an existing policy, with an intention to substitute, constituted in
law an effective and voluntary cancellation In discussing this
contention, the supreme court relied upon Appleman for a concise
statement of Southern Mutual's position:
[Pirocuring new insurance to commence before the expiration
of existing insurance has been held by some courts to constitute
a voluntary cancellation ....
However, the cancellation of a
policy ... requires a clear and unequivocal present intention
to cancel. In addition, the mere intention to cancel a policy will
not suffice to effect cancellation; such intent must be shown by
some act clearly expressing that intent."
6. Id. at 172, 191 S.E.2d at 8. See Guy v. National Old Line Ins. Co., 252 S.C. 47,
164 S.E.2d 905 (1968).
7. 259 S.C. at 173, 191 S.E.2d at 8. The court in ruling for the plaintiff limited its
decision to the facts of the case.
8. 259 S.C. 223, 191 S.E.2d 255 (1972).
9. Id. at 230, 191 S.E.2d at 258.
10. Id., quoting 6A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTCE § 4225 (rev. ed. 1972).
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The court then considered the only case in South Carolina in
which the Appleman reasoning has been applied, McCormack v.
Equitable FireInsurance Co." The court easily distinguished this
decision from the instant case because in McCormack at the time
of the fire the insured intended to cancel his policy. In
Emmanuel, however, the court found no evidence to support the
contention that the church or its agents intended or accepted the
2
oral binder as a substitute.'
Southern Mutual also argued that the policy contained a
limitation on the amount of insurance that the church was permitted to carry and that violation of this limitation voided the
policy. 13 The supreme court concluded that the only provision
which referred expressly and exclusively to other insurance was
the following clause: "Other insurance may be prohibited or the
amount of insurance may be limited by endorsement attached
hereto."' 4 Because there was no endorsement attached, the court
decided Southern Mutual had to rely solely on the valuation
clause, wherein the parties had agreed that the amount of insurance carried would be the face amount of the policy.' 5
The court again cited Appleman for the hoary proposition
that ambiguous provisions in an insurance policy which cause
forfeitures are to be construed in favor of the insured. The court
reasoned that, in the absence of an endorsement to the "Other
Insurance" clause, an "average person" might not realize that
additional coverage was prohibited and also might not comprehend the limitation in the valuation clause. Thus, by resolving
this ambiguity in favor of the church, the court allowed it to
enforce the policy.
The second decision in the multiple policy area was
Hutchinson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. '" In this case the
insured sought recovery of total disability benefits for an injury
sustained in 1968. Metropolitan attempted to avoid liability by
contending that, because Hutchinson had not returned to a con11. 102 S.C. 473, 86 S.E. 1059 (1915). Prior to bringing the instant action, the plaintiff
compromised a suit brought against the second insurer. Since both companies could not
be liable, the court considered this positive proof of an election.
12. 259 S.C. at 231, 191 S.E.2d at 258.
13. Id.
14. 259 S.C. at 231-32, 191 S.E.2d at 259.
15. Id.
16. 6A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTIcE § 4146 (rev. ed. 1972).
17. 259 S.C. 219, 191 S.E.2d 157 (1972).
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dition of partial disability after an accident suffered in 1965, he
could not have entered a new period of total disability in 1968.
To reinforce this contention, Metropolitan elicited testimony establishing that Hutchinson had continuously received total disability benefits under another policy between 1965 and 1968. The
trial court held for the plaintiff, and Metropolitan appealed,
arguing that the court had erroneously ignored the evidence concerning the other policy."1
The supreme court considered this argument to be without
merit primarily because Metropolitan under its own policy had
paid the plaintiff for only 52 weeks of total disability after the
1965 accident. Moreover, Metropolitan failed to prove that the
other policy in question was identical to its own. Thus the court
held the testimony concerning that policy had been correctly disregarded as irrelevant because the receipt of benefits under another policy "ordinarily sheds no light on whether or not the
insured is totally disabled under the policy issued by the defendant." 9
IV.

COVERAGE

During the survey period this aspect of insurance was the
most frequently litigated. Six of the seven cases included within
this area dealt with the extent of statutory coverage, and significantly, with the exception of the uninsured motorist decisions,
the court in each case refused to liberalize coverage.
A.

Fire and Windstorm Coverage

In McNeely v. South CarolinaFarm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.,2" the only question presented to the supreme court was
whether the insurer under a fire and windstorm policy could elect
to replace property totally destroyed by wind rather than pay the
full face amount of the policy. The insured frivolously maintained
that section 37-154 of the South Carolina Code2 required the
insurer to pay the face amount for a total loss caused either by
fire or wind. Although the statute plainly obligates an insurer to
18. Id. at 221-23, 191 S.E.2d at 158-59.
19. Id. at 223, 191 S.E.2d at 159, quoting Garrett v. Mutual Benefit Ins. Co., 239 S.C.
575, 583, 124 S.E.2d 36, 40 (1962).
20. 259 S.C. 39, 190 S.E.2d 499 (1972).
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-154 (1962).
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pay the full amount when fire is the cause, it does not mention
total losses caused by wind. Thus the court compared the pre1947 statute22 with the present, amended version and perfunctorily reasoned that if the legislature had desired to include "total
loss by wind" it easily could have done so. 23 The court then examined the policy in question to determine whether it allowed the
insurer the option of replacing and, upon ascertaining that it did,
24
held for the insurer.
B.

Non-Owner Clause

In Adcox v. American Home Assurance Co. 5 the named insured, Adcox, was operating his mother's automobile when he
was involved in a three-car collision caused by his negligence and
that of another driver, Stephens. Three victims of the accident
then brought an action against both drivers. Stephens' insurer,
State Farm, was the only company defending because Adcox's
insurer denied coverage on the basis of its non-owner provision.
After a verdict had been returned against the defendants, State
Farm loaned each plaintiff the amount of his judgment and in
return obtained unconditional demand notes made out to itself
and to its insured. The judgment of each plaintiff was then filed
against Adcox, but none was filed against State Farm's insured.26
Adcox went before the lower court seeking to have his insurer, American Home, declared liable for the judgments, his
defense fees, and damage to his credit resulting from the judgments. The accident victims also filed an answer and cross action
22. No. 49, [1896] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1130.
23. 259 S.C. at 42-43, 190 S.E.2d at 500-01; S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-154 (1962) reads
as follows:
No company writing fire insurance policies, doing business in this state, shall
issue a policy for more than the value stated in the policy or the value of the
property to be insured, the amount of the insurance to be fixed by the insurer
and insured at or before the time of issuing the policy. In case of total loss by
fire the insured shall be entitled to recover the full amount of insurance . ...
[Emphasis added.]
Prior to 1947 the statute read: "[A]nd in the case of total loss by fire, the insured shall
be entitled to recover the full amount of insurance ....
" No. 49, [1896] S.C. Acts &
Jt. Res. 1130 (emphasis added).
24. The policy authorized the insurer "to replace the property destroyed . . . with
other of like kind and quality within a reasonable time .
259 S.C. at 44, 190 S.E.2d
at 501.
25. 258 S.C. 331, 188 S.E.2d 785 (1972).
26. Id. at 334-35, 188 S.E.2d at 786-87.
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against American Home seeking satisfaction of their judgments.
American Home's defenses were that its non-owner clause excluded coverage, that, because Adcox and Stephens were jointly
liable, State Farm by its loan arrangement had satisfied the judgments, and that State Farm was the real party in interest and as
such had no claim against Adcox. The trial judge held for the
plaintiffs on all three issues and American Home appealed.
The supreme court found that the policy afforded coverage
to Adcox as the named insured by interpreting the phraseology
and punctuation of the non-owner clause to mean that only nonscheduled automobiles owned by the named insured were excluded from coverage. The court reasoned that the remaining
exclusions applied solely to the named insured's spouse. Therefore Adcox did have coverage when driving a vehicle owned by a
member of his household."
Considering the appellant's next exception, the court reviewed State Farm's loan arrangements and determined that
since coverage existed the plaintiffs had a right to demand that
American Home satisfy their judgments. The court disagreed
with American Home's argument that the judgments had been
paid, because no judgment had been entered against State
Farm's insured and under South Carolina decisions a plaintiff
can elect to sue tort-feasors severally or jointly.1
In disposing of American Home's third exception, the court
decided that State Farm was not the real party in interest and
thus affirmed a line of cases approving the use of loan-receipt
arrangements."5 The court, however, did find for American Home
27. The policy provided in part:
The insurance does not apply
a. as respects the named insured, to any automobile owned by the named
insured and as respects the spouse of the named insured, to any automobile
owned by the named insured, such spouse or member of the same household
Id. at 336-37, 188 S.E.2d at 787 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 338, 188 S.E.2d at 788. See American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 251 S.C. 507, 163 S.E.2d 926 (1968); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 249 S.C. 592, 155 S.E.2d 591 (1967). The last case was cited by plaintiffs as
holding:
Under the laws of this State, one injured by the actionable negligence of two or
more joint tort-feasors may elect that party or parties whom he will sue and may
pursue the collection of a judgment procured against any one or more of the

judgment debtors.
Id. at 598, 155 S.E.2d at 594.
29. See Wrenn & Outlaw, Inc. v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 246 S.C. 97, 142

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol25/iss3/10

6

Jacobsen: Insurance

1973]

INSURANCE

on its fourth exception by declaring that the evidence was insuffi3
cient to sustain an award for damage to Adcox's credit. 1
C.

The Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act

During the survey period two cases were decided in the South
Carolina Supreme Court and one in the federal court interpreting
the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act .' In each case the
court held that the Act provides no coverage when members of
an insured's household drive vehicles not scheduled in his policy.
In Crenshaw v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co.,31 the
step-daughter of the named insured was involved in an accident
while driving a non-scheduled vehicle, and a judgment was subsequently obtained against her by the accident victim, Crenshaw.
Crenshaw then sued the named insured's carrier, Preferred Risk,
contending that the step-daughter was a statutory insured under
section 46-750.31(2) of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility
32
Act.
Preferred Risk denied liability and requested summary judgment, arguing that its policy defined the term "insured," for the
purpose of non-scheduled vehicles, as the named insured and
spouse.3 3 The supreme court accepted this interpretation of the
policy. By adopting the reasoning from Willis v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 34 it also decided that sections 46-750.31(2) and 46750.32 of the Act 35 did not require coverage for the step-daughter.
In Willis the court had examined the wording of section 46-750.32.
It determined that use of the term "such vehicles," when referring
S.E.2d 741 (1965); Martin v. McLeod, 241 S.C. 71, 127 S.E.2d 129 (1962); South Carolina
Elec. & Gas. Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 230 S.C. 340, 95 S.E.2d 596 (1956); Phillips v.
Clifton Mfg. Co., 204 S.C. 496, 30 S.E.2d 146 (1944).
30. 258 S.C. at 339, 188 S.E.2d at 789.
30.1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-701 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1971).
31. 259 S.C. 302, 191 S.E.2d 718 (1972).
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.31(2) (Cum. Supp. 1971) reads:
The term "insured" means the named insured and, while resident of the same
household, the spouse of any such named insured and relatives of either, while
in a motor vehicle or otherwise, and any person who uses, with the consent,
expressed or implied, of the named insured, the motor vehicle to which the
policy applies and a guest in such motor vehicle to which the policy applies or
the person representative of any of the above.
See also "Uninsured Motorist Coverage" section of this Survey infra.
33. 259 S.C. at 304, 191 S.E.2d at 719.
34. 253 S.C. 91, 169 S.E.2d 282 (1969).
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.31(2), -750.32 (Cum. Supp. 1971).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1973

7

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 10
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEw

[Vol. 25

to required coverage, indicates that the legislature intended statutory coverage for section 46-750.31 insureds only when their
liability arises from the ownership, maintenance, or use of
scheduled vehicles.3 6 Thus, because the insured's step-daughter
was driving a non-scheduled vehicle, she was not covered when
the collision with Crenshaw occurred.
In Aetna Insurance Co. v. Government Employees Insurance
Co.,31 a case identical to Crenshaw, the supreme court in a per
curiam opinion affirmed the denial of coverage by simply citing
Crenshaw 38
The federal district court in State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 39 dealt with
another fact situation very similar to that in Crenshaw. The
court, in considering State Farm's motion for a declaration that
none of its three auto policies afforded coverage to the named
insured's daughter, cited Crenshaw as binding on the scope of
section 46-750.31(2).40 The court recognized, however, that the
Crenshaw holding only limited statutory coverage; it was still
necessary for the court to interpret the policy in order to ascertain
whether voluntary coverage existed.
State Farm predictably contended that the non-owner clause
in its policy provided bodily injury and property damage liability
coverage only for the named insured and his spouse. The court
examined the non-owner clause and found that the coverage did
appear to be so limited. After construing this clause as a whole,
however, the court was struck by the apparent disharmony of
subsection 1(c) with other parts of the clause, in that it gave the
impression of extending coverage beyond the other sections.
Section 1 of the non-owner clause provided bodily injury and
property damage coverage for the named insured (subsection (a))
and for his spouse (subsection (b)); but subsection (c) declared,
"Any person or organization not owning or hiring such automobile [is covered], but only with respect to his or its liability for
the use of such automobile by an insured as defined in subsections (a) and (b) . . . "I Thus, subsection (c) appeared to ex36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

253 S.C. at 96-7, 169 S.E.2d at 284-5.
253 S.C. 306, 191 S.E.2d 720 (1972).
Id. at 308, 191 S.E.2d at 721.
349 F. Supp. 158 (D.S.C. 1972).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.31(2) (Cum. Supp. 1971).
349 F. Supp. at 161.
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tend coverage to "any [other] person" by its first part and yet
to limit coverage by its second part to those persons mentioned
in subsections (a) and (b).42 Relying upon Heffron v. Jersey Insurance Co.,"3 the court decided that the ambiguity of the non-owner
clause required a finding that bodily injury and property damage
coverage did exist for persons other than the named insured and
spouse.
Another important question before the court was whether
coverage was limited to a single policy or extended to all three
policies issued by State Farm. The court found that State Farm's
liability was confined to the highest applicable limit of all policies
issued to the same named insured. In the instant case State Farm
had issued two of its three policies to the father of the minor
driver and the third to the mother. Therefore, the court determined State Farm's total liability to be the higher applicable
limit of the two policies issued to the father combined with the
applicable limit of the single policy issued to the mother."
D.

Uninsured Motorist Coverage

In CriterionInsurance Co. v. Hoffman45 the insured, the victim of a hit-and-run accident, had been unable to locate the
driver and therefore obtained a "John Doe" default judgment
pursuant to the Uninsured Motorist Act.4" A copy of the summons
was forwarded to Hoffman's carrier, Criterion, through the Secretary of State, but no complaint was filed or served. Criterion
brought an action to avoid liability on the judgment, contending
that its policy afforded Hoffman no coverage since he had failed
to serve the complaint and summons as required both by statute
and the policy. Hoffman in turn denied failure of service and
42. Id. at 162. The court in reviewing the non-owner clause decided that subsection
1(c) was meaningless. This would seem incorrect because the clause provides coverage for
third parties to the extent (policy limit) they are exposed to suit by the actions of subsection 1(a) and 1(b) insureds. Therefore, subsection 1(c) may be out of harmony with the
rest of the clause, but it is not meaningless.
43. 144 F. Supp. 5 (D.S.C. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1957).
44. The applicable policy provision read: "[1The total limit of the company's liability under all such policies shall not exceed the highest applicable limit of liability under
any one such policy." 349 F. Supp. at 163. The court determined that this paragraph
referred only to policies issued to the named insured because it did not contain the broad
reference to "any person insured hereunder," found elsewhere in the provision. Id. at 164.
45. 258 S.C. 282, 188 S.E.2d 459 (1972).
46. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-750.31 to -750.40 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
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alleged that his attorney had notified Criterion's adjuster of the
suit, and that Criterion had failed to make an appearance in the
"John Doe" action because it believed Hoffman's policy had been
cancelled.
The South Carolina Supreme Court examined the applicable
statute and decided that, unlike the usual uninsured motorist
action, a suit involving a hit-and-run vehicle or an unidentified
motorist requires service of both a summons and a complaint.4 7
The court next examined the uninsured motorist endorsement to
Criterion's policy and found that it was consistent with the statute because it too made service of a complaint a condition precedent to establishing a right of action."8
Dismissing Hoffman's challenges to the statutory requirements, the court held that sections 46-750.31 through 46-750.35
of the Code were exclusive as to uninsured motorist actions and
that the general statutory procedures for filing 9 were thus not
applicable. To reinforce this interpretation of legislative intent,
the court noted that the legislature had acted with purpose in
changing the statutory provision to require service of both a summons and a complaint." The court then sought refuge from the
47. Id. § 46-750.35 provides:
If the owner or operator of any vehicle causing injury or damages by physical
contact be unknown, an action may be instituted against the unknown defendant as "John Doe" and service of process may be made by delivery of a copy
of the summons and complaint or other pleadings to the clerk of the court in
which the action is brought. . . . [Emphasis added.]
48. The policy clause in question read:
4. Notice of legal action. If, before the company makes payment of loss hereunder, the insured or his legal representative shall institute any legal action for
bodily injury or property damage against any person or organization legally
responsible for the use of the automobile involved in the accident, a copy of the
summons and complaint or other process served in connection with the legal
action shall be forwarded immediately to the company by the insured or his
legal representative.
8. Action against the company. No actionshall lie againstthe company unless,
as a condition precedent thereto, the insuredor his legal representativehasfully
complied with all the terms of this amendment.
258 S.C. at 290-91, 188 S.E.2d at 463 (emphasis added).
49. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-401, -633 (Supp. 1972).
50. No. 311, [1959] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 567, reads as follows:
[A]nd service of process may be made by delivery of a copy of the motion for
judgment or other pleadings to the clerk of the court in which the action is
brought and service upon the insurance company issuing the policy shall be
made as prescribed by the law as though such insurance company were a party
defendant.
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issue by declaring that the right of action was created by the
legislature and thus only it could relax the service requirements.
In considering Hoffman's final allegation, that Criterion had
waived its right to contest service by denying liability, the court
reviewed the actions of both parties and found no evidentiary
support for the allegation. The court, however, did reverse in part
the trial judge's ruling that Hoffman was barred from further
pursuit of his claim, holding that the record did not justify such
a conclusion.
The second case involving uninsured motorist coverage was
Midwest Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance
Co. ,51an action to compel contribution. The accident upon which
this suit was based occurred in 1966 when S.W. Towles was struck
by an uninsured motorist while driving a friend's motorbike. Midwest Mutual was the uninsured motorist carrier for the motorbike
and settled Towles' claim. It then contacted Fireman's Fund,
Towles' mother's carrier, and sought contribution. Fireman's
Fund refused on the basis of its uninsured motorist endorsement
and convinced the trial judge that, because its endorsement only
provided excess coverage when other insurance was available to
the insured for a non-owned automobile, it was not liable for
contribution until Midwest Mutual's applicable limits had been
52
exhausted.
Midwest Mutual appealed, arguing that a motorbike was not
encompassed by the term "automobile" when used in an insurance policy. Relying on definitions of "automobile" borrowed
from several foreign decisions,13 the supreme court accepted that
argument. The court concluded that if Fireman's Fund intended
to be excess in the case of "motorbikes" the policy should have
51. 258 S.C. 533, 189 S.E.2d 823 (1972).
52. The uninsured motorist endorsement to the Fireman's Fund policy provided:
Other Insurance. With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying
an automobile not owned by the named insured, the insurance under this endorsement shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance
available to such insured and applicable to such automobile as primary insurance, and this insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which the limit
of liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such other
insurance.
Id. at 536-37, 189 S.E.2d at 825.
53. Id. at 537-38, 189 S.E.2d at 825-26, citing Westerheusen v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co.,
258 Iowa 969, 140 N.W.2d 719 (1966); Mittelsteadt v. Bowee, 9 Wis. 2d 44, 100 N.W.2d
376 (1960).
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so stated in plain language, and that its failure to do so made
Fireman's Fund liable for contribution.
Fireman's Fund had contended that there could be no contribution between insurers when only pro rata liability existed, and
that Midwest Mutual's statutory right to subrogation against the
tort-feasor was its only remedy. The court, however, resolved both
contentions against Fireman's Fund: First, because the liability
of each insurer was for the full amount stated in its policy as
required by the Uninsured Motorist Act, 54 with the pro rata
clause simply controlling the rights between the two insurers; and
second, because the Act evidenced no intent to make subrogation
against the tort-feasor the exclusive remedy. 5
V.

MISCELLANEOUS

In Hester v. Harleysville Insurance Co.,56 a vehicle owned by
Spartanburg Heating, Inc., was involved in an accident while
being used without permission. The plaintiff, Hester, obtained a
default judgment against Spartanburg Heating, but its insurer,
Harleysville, never received the service of process required by the
policy. Hester in the instant case then sought to compel Harleysville to pay the judgment, maintaining that by various actions
Harleysville had waived its right to notice. Although the civil
court held for the plaintiff, the county court reversed, finding no
evidence from which a waiver could be inferred.
The single exception before the supreme court was based
upon a letter written by Harleysville to Hester's insurance company. In the letter Harleysville denied coverage because Spartanburg Heating had informed it that the vehicle had been used
without permission. Hester contended that this letter constituted
a waiver of Harleysville's right to notice.
The supreme court relied upon the reasoning of Boyle Road
& Bridge Co. v. American Employers' Insurance Co.,5" wherein
the court stated that mere knowledge by an insurance company
that the insured has received service of process does not amount
to a waiver or an estoppel. There must also be a positive act by
the insurer upon which a waiver may be predicated, and this act
46-750.33 to -750.38 (Cum.
55. 258 S.C. at 539, 189 S.E.2d at 826.
56. 259 S.C. 45, 190 S.E.2d 487 (1972).
57. 195 S.C. 397, 11 S.E.2d 438 (1940).
54. S.C. CODE ANN. §§
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must be known to the insured. In pursuing this reasoning, the
court acknowledged its opinion in Washington v. National Service Fire Insurance Co.58 that a waiver may be inferred when the
insurer has denied liability and responsibility for defending. The
court considered this rationale inapposite, however, because it
believed the lower court was correct in finding no evidence that
the insured was denied coverage. The record showed that Spartanburg Heating had no knowledge of Harleysville's letter to Hester's insurer until after the default judgment had been entered.
Thus, in the court's view, the letter was only an assertion by one
insurance company to another of a defense to be relied upon and
was not a formal denial of coverage to the insured. This conclusion led the court to decide that the judgment for Harleysville had
to be affirmed because no waiver had occurred, and Harleysville
therefore had a right to rely on its policy provisions.
In Wright Scruggs Shoe Co. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,-9 the plaintiff, beneficiary of a life insurance policy issued
to its employee by Equitable, brought an action against the insurance company to compel payment of an additional death benefit.
The policy provided that the benefit would be paid upon receipt
of proof "[t]hat the death of the insured resulted from accidental
bodily injury, directly and independently of all other causes," but
would not be paid "if the death was caused or contributed to,
directly or indirectly, by disease or illness of any kind .... "I'
The trial court granted an involuntary nonsuit because both
expert witnesses, a pathologist and a private physician, testified
that they believed the insured had died of a heart attack. The
supreme court in affirming this decision followed the holding of
Gamble v. Travelers Insurance Co.,' that the plaintiff must carry
the burden of proving the insured's death was accidental.
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Wilson 2 J.A. Evans' son collided with Grace Wilson while negligently driving his father's
automobile without permission. Allstate's liability policy limited
coverage to the named insured, his spouse, and those driving the
insured automobile with their consent. Nevertheless, Allstate
58. 252 S.C. 635, 168 S.E.2d 90 (1969).
59. 258 S.C. 253, 188 S.E.2d 477 (1972).
60. Id. at 255, 188 S.E.2d 478.
61. 251 S.C. 98, 160 S.E.2d 523 (1968), citing Coleman v. Palmetto State Life Ins.
Co., 241 S.C. 384, 128 S.E.2d 699 (1962).
62. 193 S.E.2d 527 (S.C. 1972).
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defended Evans and his son under a letter reserving its rights and
continued to represent the son after a nonsuit had been granted
to Evans. 3 However, when the trial concluded and $9000 in damages were awarded to Mrs. Wilson, Allstate withdrew from the
defense and denied coverage. Allstate then sought a declaratory
judgment absolving it of liability to Wilson in an action in which
Wilson's uninsured motorist carrier, Employers-Commercial, was
joined at its own request. Employers-Commercial averred that by
defending Evans' son Allstate had waived its reservation of
rights, and that this defense had so prejudiced EmployersCommercial's position that Allstate should be held liable for the
judgment against the son.
The supreme court decided that Allstate's defense in the
original action was required because Wilson's complaint alleged
that Evans' son had permission to drive the vehicle covered by
Allstate's policy. 4 In the court's view, Allstate's actions had not
precluded Employers-Commercial's statutory right to defend or
control because the right did not arise until the Evans vehicle had
been found uninsured.65 Therefore, the court concluded that no
waiver had taken place and that sufficient prejudice had not
occurred to warrant estopping Allstate from denying coverage.
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63. "[Its] policy . . . provided that Allstate would defend any suit alleging bodily
injury and seeking damages ...
payable under the terms of the policy." Id. at 528.
64. Id. at 530, citing Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 252
S.C. 428, 166 S.E.2d 762 (1969) (complaint raises the obligation to defend).
65. 193 S.E.2d at 530, citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.31(3)(b) (Cure. Supp. 1971).
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